He stressed that the United States – like Canada and Mexico – still has the right to exit the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). The addition of a non-market economy clause, he said, simply adds a reason for a USMCA partner to withdraw and not „substantially“ change the nature of Canada`s trade agreement or policy. The inclusion of the „anti-China“ clause in the USMCA and the announcement of the United States` intention to add it to other free trade agreements have been characterized as significant developments53 The cold legal analysis of the clause, however, shows that it does not add much to existing rights and obligations arising from the relevant agreements. Given the absence of concrete effects of the clause, it is tempting to exclude its meaning and compare it to the „Really Big Button“ – a large and colorful artifact whose apparently dramatic activation has no discernible effect.54 In this case, the geopolitical aspect of economic agreements becomes very transparent. Apart from the inability of EAEU countries to agree individually on preferential treatment with the EU, it has been reported that the accession of Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia has resulted in „punishable trade measures“ on the part of Russia.74 Conversely, the announcement of Armenia`s accession to the EAEU has been described as a „surprise“ for the EU75 , which led to the review of the EU-Armenia DCFTA already negotiated at the time.76 Comprehensive and Improved Partnership Agreement“77 that each of its major neighbours is moving towards its own policy and towards its broader institutional, economic and political framework. The effect of the anti-NME clause can therefore be described as justifying, by autonomous regulation, a restriction of negotiations with third parties, which is often produced as a by-product of a particularly deep commercial integration. A related function of the anti-NME clause is not its effect on relations between EsTV parties as soon as it is invoked, but the effects of their mere presence in the agreement. This clause is not only a justification for possible future sanctions, but it is already producing effects that alter the parties` perception of their relationships, simply by being the subject of an agreement and their inclusion in a contract. This forward-looking function can be explained as a „signaling“ approach, i.e. the adoption of an expensive approach in the present, in order to show the willingness to adopt a more costly approach in the future.